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In the early 2000s the Inter-American Development Bank launched a visionary 
and influential research agenda that dramatically improved understanding of the 
policymaking process (PMP) in Latin America. It did so by detailing the role 
played by key actors in the PMP and how those actors interacted to produce 
public policy throughout the region in general, and, via the publication of a 
volume in English and an updated version in Spanish, in eight countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela) in 
particular. This paper reviews the degree to which these eight country-level 
analyses still accurately portray the actors and their role in the PMP today. It 
concludes that in a large majority of the countries the analysis is still broadly valid 
and accurately describes the political institutions and actors who are pivotal for 
the policymaking game, although in some areas the original analysis would 
benefit from revision and update.  
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Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies (2008) and El Juego Político en 
América Latina: ¿Cómo se Deciden las Políticas Públicas? (2010) have had a profound impact 
on our understanding of political institutions and the policymaking process in Latin America.  
The overall project was quite unique for its time in that it combined outstanding scholarly 
research by leading economists and political scientists using cutting-edge methods with a 
conscious and clear-cut goal of providing valuable insights and information for the broader 
policy community: domestic, foreign, and multilateral. In all, the project in general and these two 
volumes in particular provided a novel and effective bridge between the world of ideas and the 
world of action.   
Together, the two volumes (the original 2008 English edition and the 2010 Spanish 
translation and minor update) are among the very most influential books on political institutions, 
politics, and policymaking in Latin America. The books serve as staples in undergraduate, 
masters, and doctoral classes across the globe while simultaneously representing some of the 
most frequently consulted sources by analysts, corporate executives, diplomats, journalists, 
policymakers, politicians, and others when they want to know who the key political actors in a 
country are, what their role in the policymaking process is, and how the policymaking process in 
a country or group of countries functions more generally. 
The genius of the volumes and the broader research agenda undergirding them is the 
impressive ability to take the best from the disciplines of economics and political science and 
apply it to the concrete and important goal of understanding the design and functioning of the 
policymaking process and policy outcomes in eight of Latin America’s most important polities.  
The intellectual and practical contributions of the volumes are vast and undeniable. Yet, the 
original chapters were written more than 20 years ago (circa 2006), in many cases using datasets 
(especially those involving non-electoral data) that only went through the first years of the 
current century. When the chapters were translated into Spanish for the 2010 publication some 
modest updates (circa 2009) were incorporated into the revisions, but almost none of the core 
data analysis was updated and extended and the additional information provided in the country 
chapters of this second volume is best thought of as an addendum more than a true revision or 
update.  
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In the eight sections that follow I review the country chapters one by one.  To guide the 
discussion I utilize the institutional template provided in Carlos Scartascini’s Chapter 2 in 
Policymaking in Latin America (2008), “Who’s Who in the PMP: An Overview of Actors, 
Incentives, and the Roles They Play,” in order to examine the extent to which the description of 
each country’s political institutions and its policymaking process contained in the respective 
chapter still accurately characterizes those institutions and that process today.  The seven main 
components of this template (some of which have multiple sub-components) are: i) The 
Executive Branch, ii) The Legislative Branch, iii) The Judicial Branch, iv) Federalism and 
Subnational Authorities, v) Political Parties and Party Systems, vi) Bureaucracies, and vii) Other 




This section provides a review of the chapter on Argentina: “Political Institutions, Policymaking 
Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Argentina”/“Un País Sin Rumbo: Como Se Hacen las 
Políticas Públicas en Argentina” by Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi.  The chapter is 
based primarily on insights and analysis of Argentine politics in the 1990s and 1980s along with 
a more limited historical focus on prior democratic (and authoritarian) periods.  It effectively 
ends its discussion at the dawn of a new political era in Argentina, the Kirchner era (2003-2015).   
Following the collapse of the government of President Fernando de la Rúa (1999-2001) 
in late 2001 and a series of presidents during December of that year, former two-term Province 
of Buenos Aires governor (and 1999 Peronist presidential candidate) Eduardo Duhalde was 
elected in a joint legislative session to complete the remainder of De la Rúa’s four-year 
presidential term. President Duhalde helped stabilize the country and put it on the track to 
recovery, but a series of incidents left him politically unable to run in the 2003 presidential 
election.  His Plan B was then to back Néstor Kirchner in the 2003 presidential contest. At the 
time, Kirchner was the governor of the sparsely populated Patagonian province of Santa Cruz.  
Kirchner was elected president and two years later definitively cemented his status as the 
undisputed leader of Peronism in the 2005 midterm elections, a title he retained until his death in 
2010 when the mantle of leadership passed to his spouse, President Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, who was first elected president in 2007, then re-elected in 2011.  Fernández was 
unable to seek a third term in 2015 due to a combination of Argentina’s constitutional limit of 
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two consecutive terms in office for presidents and Fernández’s lack of the super-majority support 
in Congress needed to begin the constitutional reform process. 
In the 10 years that have passed since the original chapter was written, its principal 
critique of Argentina’s oscillation between hope and despair has continued to ring true.  
Argentina’s sub-optimal economic performance can be linked at least in part to its choice of 
economic policies that in turn are heavily influenced by the characteristics of the political 
institutions and policymaking process in the country. 
 
2.1  The Executive Branch 
 
The description of the Argentine executive branch in the chapter corresponds by and large with 
reality today.  There have been no major transformations in the president’s constitutional powers, 
or until recently their partisan powers, and the rules governing the election of both the president 
and the legislature in the general election remain the same.   
There are though four relevant changes that merit mention.  First, during the Kirchner era 
the role of the Argentine state in the economy expanded via increased intervention, regulation, 
and nationalization/confiscation. Second, as the national government coffers (share of revenue) 
grew proportionally, the federal government’s ability to pressure provincial governors (and their 
legislators in the national congress) rose, with an ensuing increase in the president’s power vis-à-
vis the governors in the country’s federal system. While the broad contours of the federal fiscal 
game detailed in the chapter remain the same, the advantage enjoyed by the federal government 
in its interactions with the provinces is now somewhat greater. Third, in December of 2015 
Mauricio Macri replaced Fernández de Kirchner as president. Macri, however, assumed office 
with a legislative alliance that did not have a majority of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
and was a distinct minority in the Senate, a minority status that was even more severe if the unit 
of analysis is shifted from Macri’s electoral “Let’s Change” alliance to his own Federal Proposal 
(PRO) political party. It is still (only 11 months into Macri’s four-year term at the time of 
writing) too early to know if Macri’s minority coalition government will be successful, but it is 
without question a novelty for the Argentine political system.  Fourth, in 2011 Argentina first 
utilized mandatory (for parties) and compulsory (for voters) open primaries for the nomination of 
presidential and national legislative candidates, a process that subsequently was repeated in 2013 
and 2015, and will be in force in 2017 as well. 
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2.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
The chapter examines legislative organization, political careers, the pivotal role of provincial 
party bosses, and candidate selection.  By and large, the Argentine Congress remains an 
institution dominated by amateur legislators who are at the same time professional politicians.  
That is, while members of congress on average only serve one term in office, an overwhelming 
majority of the one-term members remain active in politics after leaving congress, via the pursuit 
of elected or appointive positions at the federal, provincial, and/or municipal levels.  As a result 
of the relatively brief sojourn in congress by most legislators, there continues to be a lack of 
specialization and investment in developing legislative expertise, legislative careers are short, re-
election rates are comparatively low, and provincial party bosses play an important role in 
determining both who represents their province in congress as well as how those legislators 
behave while in congress.   
The country continues to have a bicameral legislature, and the rules governing the 
election of the legislators as well as the apportionment of the seats in the Argentine Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate remain unchanged.  The one major electoral law reform that was enacted 
since the chapter’s publication was the adoption of mandatory and compulsory open party 
primaries for presidential and national legislative offices.  Tentative evidence suggests that this 
reform may have weakened the influence of provincial party bosses over the election of national 
legislators by taking control of the timing and actual running (including vote counting) of 
primary elections out of the provincial bosses’ hands, by expanding the size of the primary 
electorate, and, in some instances, by nationalizing the primary process. 
In sum, the original analysis and conclusions regarding the legislative branch remain 
accurate.  However, the data on legislative committees, political careers, re-election rates, and 
the influence of party bosses dates back to the late 1990s or early 2000s, and while the general 
trends still hold, it is not possible to know at the present time if the trend lines have risen, fallen, 
or held constant during the intervening years. In addition, the adoption of mandatory open 
primaries has likely had an adverse impact on the power exercised by provincial party bosses 
over legislators, with the change of potential relevance for understanding the incentives and 
behavior of the individual members of congress.  Lastly, while Argentina is in some respects a 
graveyard littered with failed political reform proposals, it would appear that the sun is actually 
setting on the country’s continued use of the archaic party-supplied ballots (“lista sábana”), with 
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there existing a reasonably high likelihood that future federal elections (beginning in 2017 or, 
more likely, in 2019) will be conducted using some type of electronic Australian ballot that 
(depending on the exact format adopted) could weaken the ties binding together candidates 
across different elections in a province, with the impact of coattails diminished and the 
incentives for legislators to pursue a personal vote strengthened. 
 
2.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
The chapter’s discussion of the judicial branch was relatively limited, focused largely on the 
brief tenure of Argentine Supreme Court justices.  At least to date, the chapter’s depiction of the 
Argentine Supreme Court remains relatively accurate.  However, since the publication of this 
chapter, the lower federal courts in Argentina have in some respects become more active both in 
terms of serving as a check on political power and as serving as allies of those in power. 
 
2.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
As the chapter makes crystal clear, it is impossible to interpret and understand Argentine politics 
and policymaking without a clear and accurate knowledge of its federal system.  As mentioned 
above, during the Kirchner era (2003-2015) the balance of power leaned more to the side of the 
federal government than in previous years (with consequent changes in “The Federal Fiscal 
Game” described by the authors) as a result of the growing concentration of fiscal resources in 
the hands of the executive, and the more pronounced degree of intervention by the federal 
government in the market economy.  Added to that was the status of the Kirchners as the 
undisputed leaders of the Peronist Movement (to which all but a handful of the governors 
belonged) during the latter 10 years of their reign in power.  With the arrival of President 
Mauricio Macri in December of 2015, the pendulum has begun to swing back toward the 
provinces as a result of Macri’s stronger belief in market forces and support for the country’s 
federal constitution, combined with his need to obtain the support of many Peronist deputies and 
senators, who tend to respond to provincial party bosses (especially in those provinces where the 
governor is a Peronist) in order to promote his legislative agenda. 
 
2.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
On one hand, many of the basic building blocks of the Argentine party system did not change 
over the past ten years, such as the timing of presidential and legislative elections and the 
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electoral methods utilized to elect the president, senators, deputies, and most provincial 
executives and legislators.  On the other hand, when the chapter was written the Argentine party 
system was in the midst of a period of deinstitutionalization and denationalization that was 
accelerated by the crisis of 2001, and has deepened and become more severe during the 
subsequent years.  The value of the historic Peronist and Radical party labels diminishes with 
each passing year, and politicians increasingly vault from one political group to another, with 
political careers that are increasingly independent of any formal party organization.  Temporary 
alliances are now the norm, and often do not even remain cohesive between the date of their 
formation in the fall (austral) and the actual election in the spring (austral).  There is also often 
little consistency in alliances across provinces, where parties are rivals in one province and allies 
in another.  Moreover, there is increasingly little correspondence between the electoral lists 
voters place in the ballot box in October and the congressional delegations that form in 
December, let alone the membership of those delegations as the deputies’ (four-year) and 
senators’ (six-year) tenure in office progress.   
In the midst of the denationalization and deinstitutionalization of the country’s two 
traditionally dominant political groupings, Peronism and the Radical Civic Union (UCR), the 
past dozen years witnessed the foundation and rise of the country’s first new relevant and viable 
national political party in more than 60 years, President Macri’s Republican Proposal (PRO).  At 
present, the PRO’s success is inextricably tied to the figure of Macri, but it has achieved a level 
of national prominence and influence unrivalled by any party other than Peronism or the UCR in 
the past 70 years, controlling the governorships of the Province of Buenos Aires and the City of 
Buenos Aires (de facto governor) where almost one-half of the Argentine population resides, as 
well as possessing deputies and senators who represent more than a dozen provinces. 
In sum, the Argentine party system has changed considerably over the past ten years.  It 
is less institutionalized, less nationalized, more fragmented, and at least in regard to Peronism 
and Radicalism, less programmatic.  At the same time, over the past dozen years a new major 
party has emerged, PRO, which is more programmatic than its rivals and has the potential to 
supplant the UCR as Argentina’s principal counterweight to Peronism, all while potentially 
“absorbing” some portions of Peronism into its ranks. 
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2.6  Bureaucracies 
 
The many ills associated with the Argentine bureaucracy described in the chapter continued 
during the Kirchner era.  Not only did the existing bureaucratic institutions expand in size (the 
number of public employees in particular), but they also expanded in scope as the government 
assumed a greater role in the Argentine economy.   
 
2.7  Other Institutions 
 
The overall democratic context in Argentina has remained relatively unchanged since 2006.  
During the mid to late 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s (with the exception of a short blip 
associated with the economic and social crisis of 2001), Argentina’s democracy was rated as 
“free” by Freedom House, a rating it has retained during the 2006-2016 period.  And, overall, no 
significant changes have taken place in the “Other Institutions” category.  The one partial 
exception to this general conclusion would be a recognition of the notably larger state presence 
in the market economy, especially in regard to the impact this change has had on the incentives 
undergirding policy and regulation of the energy sector, public utilities, and transportation where 
the federal government is currently a major actor (e.g., YPF, AySA, Aerolineas Argentinas). 
 
2.8  Conclusion 
 
In sum, Argentina is a good example of a chapter where the broad conclusions reached by the 
authors are today still valid and go a long way towards accurately describing the institutions and 
actors who are pivotal for the policymaking game in Argentina.  That said, a sufficient number of 
changes have occurred in some areas such that the accuracy of the original depiction varies 
depending on the specific institution and policy in question. 
 
3.  Brazil 
 
This section provides a review of the chapter on Brazil: “On the Road to Good Governance: 
Recovering from Economic and Political Shocks in Brazil”/“En el Camino hacia un Buen 
Gobierno: Recuperación de Impactos Económicos y Políticos en Brasil” by Lee J. Alston, 
Marcus André Melo, Bernardo Mueller, and Carlos Pereira.  The chapter underscores the manner 
in which Brazil’s fragmented multi-party system has required Brazilian presidents to build post-
electoral coalitions in order to govern.  The chapter highlights how the country’s presidents have 
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been by and large successful in this task, albeit at the cost of compromise on policy and power 
and the use of state resources to “buy” support, a practice which has been exposed by the far-
reaching and consequential “Operation Car Wash” corruption investigation and the ensuing fall 
out from that investigation.  Since the chapter was first written, it would appear that Brazil must 
have gotten lost somewhere down the road to good governance, with the country’s political 
system today in the midst of a significant crisis. 
 
3.1 The Executive Branch 
 
Overall, the chapter’s description of the Brazilian executive branch and of the process by which 
coalitions are formed, maintained, and managed has held true through the subsequent 
presidencies of Michel Temer (2016- ) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-16); in addition to President 
Lula da Silva’s second term (2007-11).  As Dilma’s case lays bare however, and this is 
something that the chapter only partially touched on, a major source of the success of Brazil’s 
coalition-governments was tied to the ability of two presidents, Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995-2003) and Lula (2003-2011), to manage their respective coalition governments.  Cardoso 
and Lula internalized management costs and kept conflicts largely out of the public eye and 
managed their coalitions by reshuffling their cabinets, making policy concessions, and delivering 
pork.  And, by and large, they were successful.  In contrast, Dilma employed a more centralized 
model of cabinet governance that placed limits on inter-party agreements and made her 
government more vulnerable to crises, especially given the ideologically heterogeneous 
composition of her governing coalition.  Dilma’s second administration in particular has 
highlighted that while coalition government has generally worked amidst Brazil’s feckless and 
fragmented political party system, at least in this specific instance it has failed, resulting in her 
impeachment as well as a more general crisis in governance.   
At the time of the writing of the chapter a potentially major amendment to Article 62 of 
the Constitution was still relatively green and unstudied.  This reform (Amendment 32) 
eliminated the president’s ability to re-issue presidential decrees (prior to the reform decrees 
could be reissued indefinitely without a congressional vote), but simultaneously forced Congress 
to take a position in favor or against the decree within 45 days, or see the decree go to the top of 
the legislative agenda and become the equivalent of a blocker bill.  Thus, while the initial view 
of this reform was that it would reduce presidential power, a revised position is that it may have 
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strengthened presidential power.  This is especially true in the period before 2009 at which time 
Michel Temer (then the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies) limited the scope of the type of 
decrees that could become blocker bills.  
In sum, the chapter’s general review of presidential power and coalition government in 
Brazil still holds today.  However, the personal, political, and economic failure of Dilma’s 
second presidency has removed some of the luster from the Brazilian coalition-based model of 
governance.  At the same time, there have been changes in the Brazilian political party system 
and the president’s constitutional powers that have potentially altered the powers, role, and 
incentives of the pivotal actors examined by the authors. 
 
3.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
Brazil’s highly fragmented, personalist, only modestly programmatic, weakly institutionalized, 
and relatively denationalized political party system is widely seen as a hindrance to effective 
governance in the country.  This dysfunction is most clearly observed in the Brazilian Congress.  
While Brazil has enjoyed successful governance during a majority of the past three decades, this 
success is more likely in spite of its hyper-fragmented legislative party system than because of it.  
And, of course, as Operation Car Wash has revealed, a contributing factor to this past success 
was a significant amount of political corruption. 
Over the past dozen years a few new partisan actors have arrived and a few existing 
partisan actors have changed, but the overall fragmented nature of the country’s party system has 
remained. It is not entirely clear that the legislative party discipline and practices, which the 
authors highlight as one of the key factors allowing for presidential success, have remained 
unmodified since the publication of the original chapter, nor what the impact of changing uses by 
the executive of federal funds and state block amendments has been on party switching and 
legislator behavior more generally, nor whether or not the party system has become more 
programmatic. 
 
3.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
Overall, the coverage of the judiciary in the chapter continues to provide a good description of 
this branch.  The Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) remains the most pivotal judicial actor in 
Brazil.  The rules of the game that affect the STF’s role in the policymaking process remain 
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relatively the same as those described in the chapter.  The STF has exclusive jurisdiction over 
constitutional matters related to direct actions of unconstitutionality; declaratory actions of 
constitutionality of federal and state laws or administrative acts, and actions of 
unconstitutionality by omission.  One exception to this general pattern of continuity is a 2015 
reform that increased the age of mandatory retirement from 70 to 75, with the politically relevant 
short-term impact that five current STF justices who would have been forced to retire can now 
stay on the bench until they are 75. 
The chapter underscores the STF’s independence from the executive branch, and as 
contemporary evidence of that point, the STF has in recent years found itself playing a pivotal 
role in both the corruption investigation of hundreds of members of congress and dozens of 
government cabinet ministers, as well as in the impeachment of President Rousseff.  While the 
STF enjoys a relatively positive public image, the Brazilian judiciary more generally is 
considered by the public and elite to suffer from corruption and efficiency-related problems. 
 
3.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
The chapter’s description of the country’s federal system, and of the relatively limited power of 
governors over legislator behavior in congress, remains relatively spot on.  Governors continue 
to play an important role in the political career pathway of politicians and the Brazilian states 
remain very important actors within the broader policymaking process given the substantial 
autonomy endowed in them by the 1988 Constitution.  But, as the authors mention (and more 
recent research has echoed), over time the Brazilian states have become less autonomous and 
more dependent on the federal government.   
 A question that emerges from a review of politics in Brazil today is the extent to which 
the trend in the reduction of state autonomy has continued, plateaued, or receded since the 
chapter was written.  In addition, over the past dozen years we also have witnessed a growing 
popularity of federal-municipal partnerships, which, by and large, bypass the state governments 
in the area of social policy. This new “municipalization” model has likely circumscribed the 
ability of governors to use social policy to fuel and support their patronage machines.  It has 
hence potentially resulted in a reduction in gubernatorial power and altered the relative roles of 
the federal government and of the state governments in the Brazilian policymaking process today, 
bolstering the former and weakening the latter. 
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3.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
The Brazilian political party system continues to generally conform to the characterization in the 
chapter.  The party system remains among the most fragmented in the world, and most, though 
not all, of the principal parties active during the time the chapter was written remain alive and 
well today.  As mentioned above, however, there are questions on the degree to which the 
broader party system has become more programmatic and the extent to which there have been 
changes in the level of discipline, cohesion, and institutionalization of the parties at both the 
federal and state level. 
 
3.6  Bureaucracies 
 
The Brazilian bureaucracy today continues to conform to the authors’ description of being an 
important institutional actor but also one over which the president possesses a considerable 
amount of influence as the result of his/her appointment of top officials (DAS 4 to 6).  While 
appointments to the top-tier positions focus on influencing policy and exercising control over the 
bureaucracy, appointments to the lower tier positions (DAS 1 to 3) tend to have as their goal the 
provision of political patronage.  It is unclear to what extent a 2005 decree declaring that a higher 
proportion of appointments had to be based on merit has affected the authors’ portrayal of the 
Brazilian public administration, although the most likely scenario is that it has not altered the 
broader politically motivated trends detailed in the chapter. 
One topic that could be investigated more fully is the role played by political 
appointments in the bureaucracy in the establishment and maintenance of the country’s 
governmental coalitions.  Another is an analysis of variance in the prevalence of political 
appointees and lower level patronage positions in different ministries.  For instance, it has been 
suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and Ministry of Finance tend to have 
few political appointees and patronage posts, while other ministries such as the Ministry of 
Agriculture tend to have a plethora of them.  And, it is also possible that different political 
parties and coalition members have access to disproportional numbers of high-level political 
appointments and low-level patronage positions. 
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3.7  Other Institutions 
 
The broader democratic, economic, and societal context in which Brazil’s political institutions 
function has remained largely unmodified compared to a decade ago when the chapter was 
written.  One major change has however been the growing public discontent with the country’s 
endemic political corruption and the existence of considerable pressure to both punish corrupt 
officials but also effect institutional reforms to reduce the incentives and ability for public 
officials in the future to engage in similar corrupt behavior.  For the present time it is an enigma 
if the current crisis will result in a profound change in the status quo, or, if after a few sacrificial 
lambs have been sent to the altar, it will be business as usual (with some cosmetic changes to 
mollify the public).  The answer is relevant for the Brazilian policymaking process given the role 
that political corruption has played in making Brazilian government work within the context of 
the country’s fragmented and individualistic political system. 
 
3.8  Conclusion 
 
The original Brazilian chapter’s description of the key political actors in the country’s 
policymaking process is still relatively current and accurate.  The chapter’s present-day 
limitations lie in its depiction of the functioning of coalitions in the country and the related topics 




This section provides a review of the chapter on Chile: “Political Institutions, Policymaking 
Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Chile”/”Juego Político Cooperativo.  Instituciones, Procesos 
Políticos, y Características de las Políticas Públicas en Chile” by Cristóbal Aninat, John 
Londregan, Patricio Navia, and Joaquín Vial. Among Latin America’s political systems, Chile 
has for the past two dozen years been the region’s golden child.  Among the eight countries 
examined in the volume, Chile without doubt had the system that most closely approximated that 
needed to produce an optimal policymaking process.  Of course, as the authors pointed out, the 
Chilean system was not perfect, but in Latin America it was as close to perfection as one could 
find, both then and now. 
The authors highlighted four salient institutional characteristics that significantly 
influenced the policymaking process in Chile during the first two decades of the post-Pinochet 
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era: one, a party system consisting of two closely knit and stable coalitions (one on the center-
left and one on the center-right); two, a chief executive in possession of considerable agenda-
setting power; three, a policymaking process replete with veto players; four, an independent 
judiciary and non-corrupt and reasonably efficient bureaucracy. 
Reflective of Chile’s stable democratic institutions and robust democracy, it is perhaps 
not all that surprising that the depiction of the key political actors and their role in the 
policymaking process circa 2006 (and 2009) continues to do an expert job of describing the key 
political actors and their role in the policymaking process in 2016.  An exception to this 
description of continuity lies in a potentially major electoral reform that will first be in force in 
the November 2017 congressional elections, to be held concurrently with the 2017 presidential 
contest.  This reform, which will be discussed in more detail below, could potentially sow the 
seeds of destruction of Chile’s model political system, but it could also merely alter how and 
when coalitions are formed rather than dramatically altering the essence of current Chilean party 
politics and policymaking.  The 2017 campaign will provide some initial signals regarding which 
of these (or more intermediate) pathways Chile will follow, with the 2018-2022 period serving as 
the proving ground for what could be a new era for political parties and coalition governments in 
Chile. 
 
4.1  The Executive Branch 
 
The description of the executive branch and presidential powers contained in the chapter remains 
relatively current today.  The passage of time and increase in the number of years of democracy, 
in particular the sole post-1989 presidency of a non-Concertación/New Majority coalition 
president (the presidency of Sebastián Piñera between 2010 and 2014), only provide us with 
more confidence in the robustness of the chapter’s findings and conclusions.   
In sum, the Chilean president retains the substantial agenda-setting powers that formed 
one of the four pillars of the Chilean model described by the authors.  If anything, a 2005 
constitutional reform (Law 20,050) and its implementation increased the already substantial 
powers of the Chilean president.  This reform repealed one of the vestiges of the Pinochet-era 
constitution that denied the president the power to remove the commander and chief of the 
Chilean Armed Forces and to remove the general director of the Chilean National Police 
(Carabineros).  With the reform, the president now possesses this authority. 
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At the same time, the years subsequent to the publication of the chapter experienced the 
same type of stable coalition government witnessed during the period covered in the chapter.  
The Chilean political party system remained dominated by two stable programmatic coalitions, 
one on the left and center left and one on the right and center right.  These electoral coalitions 
also served as the respective governmental coalitions of the presidents elected during this period: 
Michelle Bachelet (Concertación: 2006-10), Sebastián Piñera (Coalition for Change: 2010-14), 
Michelle Bachelet (New Majority: 2014- ). 
 
4.2 The Legislative Branch 
 
The legislative branch remains an important veto player within the Chilean political system.  The 
description of the legislative branch, ranging from the electoral rules and their impact on the 
formation of electoral and governmental coalitions to the internal functioning of the Congress, 
remains quite accurate. As predicted in the chapter, the 2005 constitutional reform that 
eliminated the institutional senators (another vestige from the Pinochet era) has allowed the 
Concertación/New Majority coalition to possess a majority of the seats in the Chilean Senate. 
While the effective number of legislative parties measured using the coalition as the unit 
of analysis remained relatively constant during this period, the 2013 election witnessed a 
significant increase in the effective number of legislative parties using the party as the unit of 
analysis.  This increase was primarily the product of a decision made by the New Majority 
coalition (née Concertación) to formally incorporate the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) into 
the coalition, which allowed the PCCh to bolster its presence in the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
4.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
The Chilean judicial branch continues to perform its role as a strong check on the executive 
branch, albeit one that is not actively involved in the design and passage of legislation.  The 
Chilean Supreme Court remains the final and most important of these judicial/operational 
enforcement institutions. Supporting roles in checking the executive branch and other institutions 
continue to be performed by the comptroller general and the constitutional tribunal, the latter of 
which saw its powers enhanced by the 2005 constitutional reform. 
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4.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
Chile continues to be a unitary state where power is concentrated in the national government.  
The president continues to appoint the leaders of the country’s 15 regions (up from 13 following 
the 2005 constitutional reform).  The only elected local authorities are mayors and city council 
members, who play a relatively modest role in the Chilean policymaking process. 
 
4.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
The Chilean party system in 2016 is very similar to the Chilean party system of 2006.  This is 
both true in regard to the two main coalitions as well as their main constituent members.  One 
exception to this general continuity is the above-mentioned move by the PCCh from outside of 
the Concertación to inside of it (now New Majority).  Another exception is the rise of the 
Progressive Party under the figure of Marco Enríquez-Ominami (a former member of the 
Socialist Party, which forms part of the Concertación/New Majority coalition). While 
unsuccessful in the legislative elections due in large part to the now defunct binomial electoral 
system (see below), Enríquez-Ominami has demonstrated considerable national popularity, 
winning 20 percent of the vote in the 2009 presidential election and 11 percent of the vote in the 
2013 presidential election.  But, overall the very stable Chilean political system continues to 
have the same major actors enjoying relatively similar levels of popular support compared to a 
decade ago.   
While all four of the pillars that have together supported the successful Chilean 
policymaking process have remained the same in the years following the publication of the 
chapter, a 2015 reform has the potential to dramatically change one of them: a party system 
consisting of two stable and closely knit coalitions.  The binomial electoral system (two-member 
electoral districts with seats allocated using the d’Hondt allocation formula, combined with an 
open list format) employed to elect members of the Chilean Chamber of Deputies and Senate 
between 1989 and 2013 created powerful incentives for the formation and maintenance of two 
strong and stable electoral coalitions.  As a result, while the Chilean political party system is 
highly fragmented among more than a half dozen relevant political parties, the negative effects 
of this fragmentation have been ameliorated by the need to form and maintain coalitions 
occasioned by the binomial electoral system.   
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This binomial system has been criticized from a variety of optics.  Some critics have 
objected to its ties to the country’s authoritarian past and de facto effect of providing the center-
right coalition (by design) with an electoral bonus.  Others have centered their barbs on the 
barriers to entry the system created for parties that do not belong to the two main coalitions.  And, 
finally, others have been critical on the difficulty to implement effective gender quotas under the 
binomial system and the consequent limited representation of women in the Chilean Congress. 
In 2015 the binomial electoral system met its demise.  It has been replaced by a more 
traditional proportional representation system, very similar to those utilized by a majority of the 
countries in the region.   
The Chilean Chamber of Deputies increased in size from 120 to 155 members, who now 
will be elected from 28 multi-member electoral districts, ranging in size from 3 to 8 seats, with a 
mean district magnitude of 5.54 and a median of 5.  Four out of every five deputies will be 
elected from districts with 5 or more seats.  The d’Hondt formula will continue to be employed, 
as will the open list format. 
The Chilean Senate also increased in size, from 38 to 50 members, who now will be 
elected from districts corresponding to the country’s 15 regions, with districts ranging in size 
from 2 to 5 seats, and with a mean district magnitude of 3.33 and median of 3.  The d’Hondt 
formula will continue to be employed, as will the open list format. 
This electoral reform occurs within a context where the first round of the presidential 
election will continue to be held concurrently with the legislative elections, and where the 
president will still be elected using the majority runoff formula.  The use of the majority runoff 
formula in combination with medium to large multi-member PR districts tends to encourage 
higher levels of legislative fragmentation than is the case when the plurality formula is utilized, 
especially in instances where the president is not eligible to run for immediate re-election (as is 
the case in Chile). 
The experience of other presidential systems, both in Latin America and elsewhere in the 
world, suggests that the 2015 electoral reform will either in the short or medium term weaken or 
splinter the two existing coalitions which have been a mainstay of Chilean politics since the 
return to democracy in 1989.  The reform also significantly lowered the barriers to entry for new 
parties to succeed in the electoral process.  As a result, the cement that has played a pivotal role 
in binding this crucial pillar of the Chilean policymaking process since 1989 has been weakened 
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by the 2015 reform.  The only question is to what extent and whether the three unchanged pillars 
are sufficiently strong to keep the Chilean policymaking process operating at the same levels of 
efficiency and success that we have become accustomed to for more than two-dozen years. 
The first signals regarding the future of Chile’s two established coalitions will be 
provided during the 2017 campaign season.  The first question revolves around whether or not 
the two leading coalitions retain their present composition in 2017, or if we will see a splintering 
of one or both coalitions.  Also relevant will be whether or not one or more viable new partisan 
groups (e.g., Progressive Party, Future Direction, Broad Front), either alone or in alliance with 
defectors from New Majority or Let’s Go Chile (née Alliance/Coalition for Change), will be able 
to grow and enjoy electoral success in the legislative elections.  And, finally, the electoral reform 
also increases incentives for the splintering of parties within a coalition, with the prospect of 
former members of one of the traditional coalition parties forming a new party that stays within 
the coalition, thereby increasing the level of intra-coalition fragmentation. 
In 2018, when the next Chilean president assumes office, they are likely to do so with a 
presidential legislative contingent (based on their electoral coalition) that is smaller than that of 
their predecessors, especially the Concertación/New Majority predecessors, but also Piñera and 
his Coalition for Change.  Depending on their situation, the next president may need to form a 
different type of governing coalition than past presidents. 
On one hand, it is important to keep in mind that these two stable coalitions are only one 
of the sources of Chilean policymaking success.  And, while the electoral reform weakens the 
electoral seat allocation incentives to maintain the coalitions, it does not destroy them nor 
eliminate other incentives, both electoral and governmental, to sustain the coalitions.  On the 
other hand, the incentives which have provided the foundation for the maintenance of the two 
major coalitions have been weakened, which, has at least increased the probability that one or 
both coalitions will see some of their members leave and (albeit much less likely at the present 
time) that the coalitions will cease to exist in their present form.  Furthermore, it is 
unquestionable that the barriers to entry for new political parties and actors have been lowered, 
and thus it is extremely likely that the 2018-2022 Chilean Chamber of Deputies and Senate will 
be significantly more fragmented (using the coalition as the unit of analysis) than any prior 
legislative party system in the current democratic era.  This suggests that the next president’s 
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support in congress is likely to be below, or at best, at the nadir for a Chilean chief executive 
during the current democratic period to date (1989-2016). 
 
4.6  Bureaucracies 
 
The Chilean bureaucracy has historically been among the most competent, efficient, and honest 
in Latin America. That continues to be the case. Similarly, while the country’s public 
administration does suffer from rigidity and a tendency to be overly procedural in organization 
and focus, it does appear (anecdotally) to have improved on those dimensions over the past ten 
years. 
 
4.7  Other Institutions 
 
The democratic and societal context in Chile has remained relatively unchanged over the past ten 
years. The Chilean population continues to enjoy robust levels of civil liberties and political 
rights within a context where the rule of law is exceptionally strong and corruption is extremely 
limited in scope. Following the 2005 constitutional reform, the national security council 
(COSENA) is no longer a significant veto player within the Chilean political system.  
 
4.8  Conclusion 
 
Of the eight country chapters, the Chilean chapter does the best job describing the current key 
actors in Chilean politics and the current Chilean policymaking process.   Chile provides a model 
for Latin America in regard to its comparatively successful policymaking process.  Three of the 
four pillars identified by the authors supporting this success remain bedrock in 2016: a powerful 
chief executive with strong agenda-setting powers, a competent and honest judiciary and 
bureaucracy, and a broader political system with multiple veto players. The fourth pillar, the 
country’s stable two-coalition dominated party system, is also quite strong today, but the 2015 
electoral reform could potentially weaken or destroy it in the future, raising the pivotal questions 
of both the impact this reform will have on the structure and functioning of these coalitions, and, 
if the impact is significant, what this means for the broader functioning of the Chilean political 
system and its policymaking process.   
 
  




This section provides a review of the chapter on Colombia: “Political Institutions and Policy 
Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects of the 1991 Constitution”/”Efectos de la Constitución de 
1991 Sobre la Formulación de Políticas Públicas en Colombia” by Mauricio Cárdenas, Roberto 
Junguito, and Mónica Pachón. The original chapter concentrated its focus on understanding the 
principal actors in the Colombian policymaking process and the impact that the landmark 1991 
Colombian constitutional reform had on the policymaking process in general and in particular on 
the positive and negative effects of the 1991 reforms on the quality of public policies in the 
country. The chapter, for instance, highlights how the 1991 reforms increased the role and 
impact of different social groups in the policymaking process, but also notes that this enhanced 
participation simultaneously created new budgetary demands that the country’s relatively rigid 
fiscal institutional framework was ill-suited to address given the high transactions costs involved. 
The data employed in the chapter are current as of 2003 to 2006, depending on the 
section.  With some exceptions that will be noted below, the general rules of the game and macro 
institutional structures have not been substantially modified since the chapter was written.  
However, while the current Colombian democratic period goes back at least to 1974 (and to an 
earlier period for some observers), the post-1991 period is relatively brief, and the chapter was 
based largely on only a dozen years of data.  
 
5.1  The Executive Branch 
 
With one exception, the broader functioning of the Colombian executive branch continues to 
correspond to the depiction contained in the chapter. Up until a 2005 constitutional reform, the 
Colombian president was not allowed to seek reelection, either immediately or after sitting out 
one or more terms.  The 2005 reform allowed then President Álvaro Uribe (2002-06, 2006-10) to 
seek immediate re-election for one term, a benefit that also was enjoyed by Uribe’s successor, 
President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-14, 2014- ).  This reform was annulled in 2015 and now, as 
was the case before 2005, the Colombian president is not allowed to seek re-election.  The result 
of the 2005 reform was a significant strengthening of presidential power in Colombia compared 
to when the chapter was written, but not compared to most of the time period analyzed (nor to 
the present and future) during which time the president was/is not eligible to seek re-election, 
immediate or otherwise. 
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The period during which immediate presidential re-election was permitted was not 
included in the core analysis of the original chapter which signified that there was no empirical 
analysis of the impact of the 2005 reform on the presidency and its relationship with the other 
branches of government, along with the reform’s overall impact on the policymaking process, 
nor of the comparable impact of the 2015 repeal.  By and large, the 2005 constitutional reform 
was seen as a setback for the consolidation of Colombia’s democratic system and the 2015 
reform a positive step aiding consolidation. 
 
5.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
The 2003 electoral reform (for the Colombian Senate and Chamber of Deputies elections) 
reviewed by the authors was very consequential for partisan politics in the country, reducing 
fragmentation and increasing both democratic accountability and effectiveness. The reform 
required parties to present a single list, which could be either open or closed, though virtually all 
relevant parties have opted for open lists during the subsequent three national legislative 
elections.   
Immediately following this electoral reform was the passage of the Legislative Caucus 
Law (Ley de Bancadas) that concentrated power within the hands of the legislative delegation 
leadership (or viewed from a different perspective, the median legislator).  The original chapter 
had only one post-reform election to analyze, and even then, only the electoral results, not the 
impact on legislator behavior (nor of the consequences of the Ley de Bancadas).   
On the electoral level, for the post-reform era there have now been two subsequent (to the 
writing of the chapter) legislative elections (2010 and 2014), in addition to the election that took 
place in 2006 (and upon which the chapter relied for the entirety of its post-reform analysis), 
with a third scheduled for early in 2018.  On the legislative level, there are now three full 
congressional periods available for analysis (compared to zero in the original volume) along with 
a fourth congressional period that is now past the halfway mark. 
In sum, the rules undergirding the election of Colombian legislators and their post-
election behavior in congress were significantly changed in the period immediately prior to the 
publication of the original chapter. This timing allowed the authors to posit some potential 
effects of the reform and include the results of a single election under these rules, but not to 
empirically examine legislative behavior under the rules nor their impact in multiple elections. 
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5.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
During the intervening ten years there has been relatively little in the way of changes in the 
Colombian judicial branch.  As a result, the chapter’s coverage of this key branch of government 
continues to be relatively accurate. 
In recent years there have been several efforts to carry out a structural reform of the 
Colombian judicial system as a result of a popular view that the courts have become excessively 
politicized, thereby undermining their role as a neutral and respected arbiter in the legal and 
policymaking process. For the public, the courts have also become seen as distant from the 
concerns of the people as well as difficult to access and procedurally quite slow.  In spite of these 
broad critiques, all significant attempts over the past ten years to overhaul the judicial branch 
have failed, in part due to the very politicization that has created alliances among judges within 
the judicial branch and between judges and members of the executive and legislative branches 
that have been able to block substantial reform to date. 
Over the past decade there has been a rising amount of criticism of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court and its role in the political system more generally and in the policymaking 
process in particular.  Central to this concern is the view that the constitutional court remains 
relatively unchecked in terms of its powers within the Colombian political system.  For instance, 
there are critiques that the constitutional court has over time come to play an excessively active 
role in determining the levels and destination of public spending, severely limiting budget 
flexibility and imposing a form of embedded rigidity into the budgetary process. In sum, it would 
appear, at first glance at least, that the constitutional court has become a more important and 
influential player in the policymaking process than was the case a decade ago. 
 
5.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
Colombia retains its unitary system of government featuring the direct election of department 
governors (and departmental deputies) and municipal mayors (and municipal council members).  
The decentralization of power associated with the 1991 constitutional reform was significant in 
terms of weakening the president’s power (by no longer providing the president with the 
authority to name local executives) and in making the formation of coalitions more difficult (by 
reducing the number of positions available for distribution).   
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Overall though the department and municipal governments remain relatively limited 
actors in the Colombian policymaking process, due in large part to the country’s unitary system 
of government and the general dependence of these subnational authorities on national transfers 
to fund their operations.  One caveat to this general characterization relates to legislation passed 
in 2011 and 2012 that put in force a system of hydrocarbon and mining royalty distribution (the 
framework for which was contained in the 1991 Constitution) among subnational governments 
located in the petro-regions of the country. With these reforms, there exists a potential for greater 
political autonomy in these jurisdictions and greater ability for them to play a more active role in 
the policymaking process, particularly in regard to policies with a social welfare or local level 
focus. 
 
5.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
The above-mentioned 2003 and 2005 reforms have dramatically affected the Colombian political 
party system in terms of nationalization, polarization, fragmentation, discipline, and 
institutionalization.  The original chapter had only one election under these new rules available 
to study, a number that now stands at three and will rise to four early in 2018. 
The principal partisan actors in 2006 (e.g., the Social Party of National Unity, the 
Colombian Conservative Party, the Colombian Liberal Party) remain active and influential today.  
The original trends in consolidation and reduced fragmentation associated with the 2003 reform 
identified in the original chapter have continued in the subsequent elections, although there has 
been variation in partisan strength, internal shifts in power and splintering, and the emergence of 
some new partisan actors. 
 
5.6  Bureaucracies 
 
The original chapter contains a relatively modest discussion of the Colombian bureaucracy, 
suggesting that its role as an independent actor in the Colombian policymaking process was 
rather limited.  It would appear that this characterization continues to be broadly valid. 
 
5.7  Other Institutions 
 
More so than any of the other countries in this volume, the Colombian political system is today 
affected by the continued (albeit reduced compared to the past) presence in the country of 
paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and guerrillas. While not part of the formal democratic 
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institutional structure, these groups nevertheless continued to influence the context within which 
this structure operates.  The impact of these groups has, however, been a constant in the country 
since the 1991 constitutional reform, and, the impact and influence of these groups today is 
notably lower than when the chapter was written ten years ago, let alone than in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
 
5.8  Conclusion 
 
Overall the general framework of Colombia’s political institutions and policymaking process 
described by the original chapter continues to provide an accurate and valid depiction of the key 
political actors and the policymaking process in the country.  The principal exception relates to 
the areas of presidential re-election and to the legislative branch and political party system as a 




This section provides a review of the chapter on Ecuador: “Veto Players, Fickle Institutions, and 
Low-Quality Policies: The Policymaking Process in Ecuador/”Jugadores de Veto, Instituciones 
Volubles y Políticas de Baja Calidad: El Juego Polítco en Ecuador” by Andrés Mejía Acosta, 
María Caridad Araujo, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Sebastián Saiegh. Ecuadoran politics during the 
current democratic era, 1979-2016, can be divided into two distinct eras: pre and post-Correa.  
All of the analysis was conducted and the original version of the chapter was written before 
Rafael Correa’s election in 2006. The Spanish version contains a brief update on the first years 
of the Correa presidency, but the overall description of the political actors and policymaking 
process remained largely unchanged from the original version based on the 1979-2006 period. 
The Ecuadoran political system under President Correa has functioned rather differently 
than was the case during the first two-dozen years of the current Ecuadoran democratic period, 
with the country experiencing an unprecedented level of political stability and possessing a 
president who was more effective and powerful than his dozen third wave predecessors.  This is 
the result of both reforms contained in the 2008 Constitution as well as President Correa’s 
possession of the type of congressional majorities that had eluded his predecessors.  The 2008 
constitutional reform is briefly discussed in the Spanish language chapter, although mostly as an 
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addendum to the original chapter, with commentary that explored the potential future effects of 
the reforms (very presciently in many respects). 
President Correa is not eligible to run for re-election and will be leaving office in 2017.  
It remains an open question the extent to which the transformation of the Ecuadoran political 
system under Correa will be consolidated by his successor, or, if the system will return to its 
fragmented and feckless past. It is important to keep in mind that Correa’s rise to and 
consolidation of power was predicated on Ecuador’s weakly institutionalized political system 
(both constitutional institutions and political party institutions) and without Correa at the helm it 
is quite possible that the system will revert to its pre-Correa state. 
 
6.1  The Executive Branch 
 
The Ecuadoran executive branch, which in the past possessed reasonably strong constitutional 
powers but very weak partisan powers, has, under Correa, seen its constitutional powers increase 
(via the adoption of the 2008 Constitution) as well as experienced a dramatic enhancement of its 
partisan powers, with Correa enjoying a disciplined majority throughout most of his tenure in 
office.  A portion of this increased presidential power (the constitutional power) vis-à-vis the 
legislative and judicial branches will without question extend beyond Correa’s tenure.  In 
contrast, the president’s partisan power may or may not continue to be at the same level 
depending on the ability of Correa’s successor to win a congressional majority in 2017 and 
exercise influence over his/her delegation in the national congress. 
The 2008 Constitution increased the president’s constitutional powers, powers that were 
already quite strong.  It also allowed the president to seek immediate re-election for one term 
(recent reforms now provide for unlimited consecutive re-election beginning after the 2017 
election), unlike the prior constitution that required a president to sit out one term in office prior 
to seeking re-election again.  In all, the 2008 Constitution significantly increased the power and 
influence of the president in the Ecuadoran policymaking process, an increased level of power 
that will be inherited by Correa’s successor. 
As the chapter makes crystal clear, prior to the Correa era, Ecuadoran presidents were 
saddled with small legislative contingents, with the president’s party often having a legislative 
delegation that occupied a mere one-fifth to one-third of the seats in congress.  This resulted in 
presidents with extraordinarily weak partisan powers, frequent legislative gridlock, a presidential 
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need to rely excessively on ephemeral “ghost” coalitions, and overall low quality and unstable 
public policies.  In addition, the ability of the Ecuadoran president to utilize his or her substantial 
constitutional powers in the pre-2008 era was often hindered and undermined by the meager 
level of loyal partisan support enjoyed by the president in the national legislature. 
One area where Correa’s presidency mirrors that of his predecessors is cabinet instability, 
with a frequent replacement of ministers and a series of cabinet restructurings that in addition to 
changing ministers also changed the number of ministries as well as the specific policy areas that 
each cabinet official was responsible for.  This includes the creation of the figure of coordinating 
minister (eight ministers total) as well as of two influential institutions under the president’s 
direct control (SENPLADES and SENAP).  Correa’s ministers, like the president, by and large 
possess advanced degrees and a high level of professional capacity.  But, unlike the case in the 
1990s when similarly well-credentialed ministers tended to come from the world of business and 
multilateral organizations, Correa’s ministers’ career paths are more commonly via academia. 
 
6.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
The general rules governing legislative elections have remained broadly constant since the 
chapter was written, with however some modifications. One of these modifications was a 
reduction in the average district magnitude for district representatives occasioned by the creation 
of two new provinces (Santa Elena and Santo Domingo de Tsáchilas) and the division of the 
three largest electoral districts into smaller electoral districts for the purposes of legislative 
elections, with Guayas divided into four separate electoral districts, Metropolitan Quito and 
Pichincha into four, and Manabí into two.  At the same time, a national electoral district was 
once again added (15 deputies out of a total of 137) and six deputy posts were created to 
represent Ecuadorans living abroad, with two seats for those in the United States in Canada, two 
for those in Latin America and Africa, and two for those in Europe, Asia, and Oceania. 
Under Correa the Ecuadoran National Assembly has been transformed into a more 
reactive institution, with limited legislative production.  At the same time, President Correa has 
tended to bypass the congress using the expanded decree power granted to the president under 
the 2008 Constitution, with presidential decrees now playing a preeminent role in the Ecuadoran 
policymaking process. Correa’s policymaking decrees now number in the thousands. 
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The 2008 Constitution weakened the legislative branch vis-à-vis the executive branch as 
discussed in the previous section.  It also removed competencies that the legislative branch had 
previously had via the creation of the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control 
(CPCCS), which now is responsible for the designation of a wide range of officials formally 
designated by the congress such as the attorney general, the public defender, and the members of 
the national election council (CNE).   
The Ecuadoran National Assembly/Congress has historically been characterized by a 
high level of partisan fragmentation. This is a trait that changed under Correa as the president’s 
party won majorities or near-majorities in the National Assembly. As a result the effective 
number of legislative parties plummeted under Correa while the share of the seats held by the 
president’s party increased dramatically compared to prior administrations.  Under Correa the 
legislative branch has however also become more ideologically polarized. 
It is quite feasible that the current relatively low (for Ecuador) levels of legislative 
fragmentation and the robust presidential legislative contingents are almost primarily the product 
of Correa’s personal popularity and appeal, and that absent Correa at the top of the ticket and 
holding the reins of power, these current characteristics of the system will vanish.  As a result, it 
is a distinct possibility that with Correa no longer residing in the Carondelet Palace we will see a 
relatively quick return to the highly fragmented and denationalized legislative party system that 
characterized the country in the pre-Correa era. 
 
6.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
The chapter provides a relatively brief, but effective, discussion of the judicial branch, focusing 
primarily on the Constitutional Tribunal (TC) and its role in the policymaking process.  The 
principal points regarding the judiciary made were that it was politicized and distant from the 
ideal of an independent branch that could serve as a check on executive and legislative power 
and as an honest broker in the policy process. 
The most noteworthy change in regard to the judicial branch since the original chapter 
was written was the creation (via a constitutional referendum supported by Correa) of a National 
Court of Justice (CNJ) that is now the maximum judicial authority in the country.  Overall, 
however, the general nature of judicial branch has not changed since the chapter was written, 
either in regard to politicization or independence. 
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6.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
Following the constitutional reform of 2008, Ecuador continues to be a unitary country with 
power concentrated in the hands of the national government. On paper the 2008 reform indirectly 
provided the provincial and municipal governments with a greater level of autonomy than they 
had previously enjoyed by clarifying the different powers enjoyed by subnational authorities in 
the country. However, that power is heavily constrained by local governments’ near complete 
dependence on national government transfers to survive financially. Their autonomy is also 
constrained by the National System of Competences.   
Overall, the chapter quite understandably did not provide a great deal of discussion of the 
role of provincial and municipal governments in the policymaking process given that it was so 
modest.  It does not appear that this reality has changed with the 2008 Constitution.  
 
6.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
The historic Ecuadoran political party system was one of the most fragmented in the hemisphere, 
generally ranking as one of the two most fragmented party systems along with Brazil.  The rise 
of Correa and his presidency has had a polarizing effect on the Ecuadoran party system, with 
Correa’s PAIS Alliance forming one pole and the opposition tending to concentrate into a group 
of smaller poles.  The result has been a notable drop in the level of party system fragmentation, 
an increase in partisan polarization, a rise in the level of party system nationalization, and the 
presence of majority of near-majority legislative blocs loyal to the president; a sharp contrast to 
the minority presidents and volatile coalitions that plagued the current Ecuadoran democracy 
during its first twenty-eight years of existence.   
 
6.6  Bureaucracies 
 
The overall description of the public administration being composed of employees who possess 
limited capacity and ambition in some areas and higher levels of training and merit-based 
performance systems in others (e.g., Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs) still holds today.  
However, the president’s control over the bureaucracy was enhanced in the 2008 constitutional 
reform in several ways.   
One reform of particular importance (discussed in the Legislative Branch section above) 
was the creation of the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control (CPCCS) which 
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removed the power to confirm many officials charged with controlling and monitoring the 
activities of the public administration from the congress.  In the past, the president’s nominees 
had commonly been confirmed by congress, but when there was a politically sensitive 
appointment, the nominee would reflect the position of the median member of congress.  At least 
under Correa, the CPCCS has been quite responsive to the president and therefore increased the 
power and influence of the executive branch over the public administration given the resulting 
more “friendly” oversight of the bureaucracy.  It remains to be seen how this system will operate 
in a different political context with a CPCCS that is less allied with the president than has been 
the case under Correa. 
 
6.7  Other Institutions 
 
The quality of democracy in Ecuador has remained relatively constant over the past twenty years.  
In addition, labor unions and social movements, especially those with a base in the country’s 
indigenous communities, have retained their ability to influence politics and the policy process 
with public protests and other mechanisms. 
 
6.8  Conclusion 
 
The rise to and consolidation of power by President Rafael Correa combined with the 2008 
constitutional reform had a dramatic and at least partially transformative impact on Ecuadoran 
political institutions and the country’s policymaking process. What remains unclear is if 
Ecuadoran political institutions and the country’s PMP have been fundamentally altered under 
Correa, or, if in a post-Correa era we will witness a return to the pre-Correa status quo of fickle 




This section provides a review of the chapter on Mexico: “Policymaking in Mexico Under One-
Party Hegemony and Divided Government”/”Formulación de Políticas en México: De La 
Hegemonía Partidista al Gobierno Dividido” by Fabrice Lehoucq, Gabriel Negretto, Francisco 
Aparico, Benito Nacif, and Allyson Benton. The original chapter was written at the dawn of a 
new political era in Mexico.  In 2000, the election of the National Action Party’s (PAN) Vicente 
Fox as president ended more seventy-five years of continuous Institutional Revolutionary Party 
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(PRI) rule.  The chapter focused on the non-democratic (pre-1982), transition (1983-94/97), and 
democratic (1994/97-2000; 2000-06) periods.  In the subsequent ten years since the original 
chapter was written many of the political reforms and structural changes associated with 
democratic rule deepened and their true impact on the Mexican policymaking process began to 
be revealed.  At the same time, 2012 saw the return of the PRI to power with the election of 
President Enrique Peña Nieto.  The chapter also was written at a time when the partisan and 
institutional diversity of state and local governments that has flourished over the past dozen years 
was not especially well understood. 
When the chapter was written, divided government was a relatively novel concept in 
Mexico.  Now it is the norm, with close to a dozen years of new data points, including four 
additional legislative periods: LX (2006-09), LXI (2009-12), LXII (2012-15), LXIII (2015-18).  
Also, when the chapter was written there was uncertainty regarding the future of the PRI, in 
particular if could survive as a dominant actor absent control of the national executive branch.  
As Peña Nieto’s election, the 2015 midterm, and current public opinion polls on the 2018 
presidential election make clear, the PRI is alive and well and is entrenched as the largest and 
most influential political party in Mexico.  Lastly, the subnational and local aspect of Mexico’s 
political system and its interaction with the federal government has become much more relevant 
for the policymaking process than was the case when the original chapter was written; though the 
chapter did presciently foreshadow future changes in this direction. 
 
7.1  The Executive Branch 
 
During the golden era of PRI rule, the Mexican policymaking process was relatively 
straightforward.  The PRI president in coordination with a set of key cabinet ministers (Hacienda, 
Gobernación) and sectoral leaders (in the corporatist sense) determined the content and execution 
of major public policies while the legislative branch and the judicial branch (and the state 
governments) played no notable role in monitoring or checking the executive in particular or in 
the policymaking process more generally. 
This system of governance and policymaking changed with the PRI’s loss of its majority 
in the Chamber of Deputies in 1997, and since this time the number of actors significantly 
involved in the policymaking process has multiplied in number and impact. This includes a 
legislative branch and a judicial branch that are much more active and influential than was 
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previously the case, but also a transformation of the Mexican political party system. The end 
result is a policymaking process that is no longer dominated by the executive branch in either the 
same manner or to the same extent as was the case prior to 1997.  Even a PRI president no longer 
exercises the same control over fellow PRI members as was the case in the past, with PRI 
governors and other leaders enjoying a level of autonomy and influence that was rare if not 
unheard of in the days when a PRI president was simultaneously the undisputed leader of the 
country and the undisputed leader of the party. 
When the chapter was written, there had been nine years of the “new normal,” with only 
three of those years under the PRI, resulting in a somewhat PAN-centric vision under which 
democratization and institutionalization were synonymous with the rise of the PAN as the party 
of government. That time period has now more than doubled, with thus more than double the 
data points now available and at the same time more variance existing in terms of presidential 
partisanship and presidents: 12 years of PAN presidential rule under two different presidents 
(Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón) and 7 years of PRI rule under two different presidents 
(Ernesto Zedillo and Enrique Peña Nieto).  
 
7.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
With the transition from hegemonic rule to divided government, the Mexican Congress has 
emerged as an influential actor in the Mexican policymaking process.  Similar to the case with 
the executive branch, the original chapter had only nine years (three legislative periods) to 
analyze, a number that has now more than doubled with the three complete periods and a fourth 
(current) incomplete period  
Since the chapter was written a fundamental change has occurred which has the potential 
to significantly alter the incentives that drive legislator behavior.  In 2014 Mexico’s longstanding 
ban on immediate congressional re-election was modified, and senators are now allowed to serve 
two consecutive six-year terms while deputies are now allowed to serve up to four consecutive 
three-year terms.  One constant is however that the Mexican political parties remain influential 
gatekeepers in regard to re-election via their control over ballot access. This re-election reform 
has further occurred within a context where legislators appear to be introducing more bills and in 
general attempting to establish a more robust personal reputation than was the case in the past 
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and where governors have come to play a more prominent role in national politics, including via 
“their” deputies and senators in congress. 
The ability of legislators to now seek immediate re-election has increased the incentives 
for legislators to cultivate a personal vote and to possibly be less responsive to party elites.  The 
caveat is however that the party still plays a fundamental role in a legislator’s career and re-
election aspirations via its control over access to the ballot under the party label (either directly 
or indirectly in the event of a primary held at the district-level).   
 
7.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
The Mexican judicial branch has come to play a much more prominent role in the policymaking 
process since the end of the era of PRI hegemony. Furthermore, since the chapter was written, 
judicial independence and power in Mexico has increased.  This is both the consequence of the 
natural evolution of a branch of government that had previously been marginalized, but within 
the context of democracy and divided government has been able to flourish, as well as the 
product of some reforms that have occurred since the chapter was written.  The most prominent 
of these reforms is perhaps the 2011 Human Rights Reform, which requires Mexico to respect 
international rights treaties and provides the judicial branch with the power to determine whether 
Mexico is in compliance or not.  It also allows for the intervention in domestic political affairs by 
international actors such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
There is also some evidence that over the past ten years the judges and the staff of the 
Mexican judicial branch has become better trained, more professional, and more efficient.  
Similar judicial reforms have taken place at the state level.  However, these reforms appear to 
have been uneven; more prevalent in the states where there is robust two-party or three-party 
competition and less robust and transformative in the one-party dominant states. 
 
7.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
With the evolution of the Mexican political system from a context of quasi-authoritarian 
hegemony to democratic pluralism, the governors of Mexico’s 32 states have become 
increasingly influential actors.  What was once a de facto unitary system is increasingly both a de 
jure and de facto federal system, where state governments play an increasingly important role in 
the policymaking process.  This role occurs both in those policy areas that are the competency of 
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the state governments under Mexico’s federal constitution, but also in national policy areas 
where governors are able to directly influence the policymaking process via those senators and 
deputies who are respond to their directives (or at least share their broader goals) as well as 
where governors represent formidable actors within the country’s major political parties 
(especially the PRI and PAN, but also the PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution]). 
The original chapter was written at a time when federalism was still young and green in 
Mexico.  The chapter highlighted a trend of growing gubernatorial and state influence in the 
policymaking process, one that has deepened and expanded in scope during the ensuing ten years. 
 
7.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
The three major parties in Mexico today are the same as those 10 years ago: the PRI, PAN, and 
PRD, although in the latter case the party has suffered more than its rivals from splintering (e.g., 
the founding of the National Regeneration Movement, MORENA).  At the same time, the 
Mexican party system has become more fragmented, with the number of smaller parties having 
increased slightly.  But, in broad brush strokes, the description of the parties in 2006 largely 
applies today: three major parties, with the PRI the country’s sole national party and the PAN 
and especially PRD possessing strong support in some regions and weak support in others.  Both 
the PAN and PRD have appeared to have adopted a strategy of concentrating their resources first 
and foremost in their electoral bailiwicks, and eschewed an attempt to compete head-to-head 
with the PRI throughout the country from Baja California Norte to Quintana Roo, and 
everywhere in between.  Within this context however the PAN and PRD have nevertheless 
brokered effective and successful alliances in state gubernatorial elections to defeat the PRI, with 
this strategy especially effective in 2016. 
The original chapter was also written at a time when the PRI’s future was somewhat 
uncertain.  However, as the subsequent 10 years have demonstrated, the party remains a vibrant 
and effective political institution, with the great advantage of being positioned as the country’s 
only true national party, representing either the strongest or second strongest party across the 
county (with the Federal District representing a notable exception).  Looking ahead towards 2018, 
while it is still early, the most likely scenarios today would appear to be either another six-year 
period (“sexenio”) of PRI control of the Mexican executive branch or a PAN president residing 
in Los Pinos beginning in September of 2018. 
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However, while the PRI has returned to power, it is not the same PRI that governed 
during the hegemonic period.  The internal functioning of the party is more democratic and the 
control exercised by the party leadership over the political careers of its members is much more 
limited than was the case in the hegemonic past. 
 
7.6  Bureaucracies 
 
In the original chapter the Mexican bureaucracy played a relatively minor role in the 
policymaking process and was not a focal point of the chapter’s analysis.  Moreover, while 
twelve years of PAN rule did result in more transparency and professionalism in the Mexican 
public administration, it appears that the underlying conclusion of the chapter regarding the 
bureaucracy’s minor role continues to accurately depict its role in the Mexican policymaking 
process. 
 
7.7  Other Institutions 
 
During Mexico’s transition from one-party authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy, the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) played a pivotal role as a neutral and independent arbiter within 
the Mexican political system.  Shortly after the chapter was written however, a 2007 reform 
weakened the IFE (since 2014, the National Electoral Institute, INE) by increasing the power of 
congress vis-à-vis the IFE in terms of the selection and removal of IFE council members and in 
terms of the ability of the Mexican Congress to audit and sanction the IFE.  The 2014 reforms in 
this area would appear to have not reversed this trend.  The result is the weakening of an 
important political actor within the Mexican political system, which, while not directly involved 
in the meat of the policymaking process, was a relevant check on majority power and a protector 
of minority party rights, especially during the electoral campaign season. 
The chapter also was finished prior to the start of President Calderón’s initiation of a de 
facto war against the drug cartels, and the ensuing violence that had a profound impact on 
Mexican politics and society, especially in a concentrated set of states and municipalities.  While 
the policies and strategies of President Peña Nieto have occasioned a reduction in deaths and 
violence, in many regions of the country the political, social, and economic context today is quite 
different than that of 1997-2006, with threats of violence against politicians and citizens greater 
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and a media in many regions of the country that now self-censures itself on many issues for 
reasons of self-preservation. 
 
7.8  Conclusion 
 
While the lion’s share of the chapter’s descriptions and conclusions still hold water today, 
Mexico fully moved from the era of one-party hegemony to democratic divided government only 
in 1997, providing the authors of the chapter with a mere nine years of data with which to 
analyze the functioning of the policymaking process in the current post-hegemony era.  In 
addition, since the chapter was written there have been significant developments in Mexican 
politics such as the return of the PRI to the presidency, the growing salience of governors, a 
removal of the ban on consecutive legislative re-election, and other changes that have without 
question modified the power and influence of different actors and therefore altered the 
description of the policymaking process provided circa 2006.  
 
8.  Paraguay 
 
This section provides a review of the chapter on Paraguay: “Political Institutions, Policymaking 
Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Paraguay”/”De la Concentración a la Fragmentación.  El 
Juego Político en Paraguay en los Últimos 40 Años” by José Molinas, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, 
Sebastián Saeigh, and Marcela Montero.  The Paraguayan political system is without question 
the least studied political system among the South American presidential democracies.  While all 
eight country chapters in this volume make a profound contribution to understanding their 
respective country’s key political actors and the role of these actors in the policymaking process, 
the contribution made by this chapter stands out due to the relative dearth of scholarly studies of 
these institutions and topics in Paraguay. This chapter arguably remains the most influential 
single piece of scholarship on the design and functioning of Paraguayan political institutions and  
the country’s policymaking process. 
The chapter detailed four historic periods in Paraguayan history over the past sixty years.  
The first two represent the apogee (1954-1981) and the gradual decline (1982-1989) of the 
authoritarian dictatorship of President Alfredo Stroessner.  The third is a short transition period 
(1989-1992) and the final is what at the time of the writing of the chapter was the current 
democratic period (1993-2006).  The chapter’s empirical analysis depended on the first dozen 
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years of the democratic period, an amount of time that since the chapter’s completion has almost 
doubled in length.  This period subsequent to the publication of the initial volume saw the 
presidential tenure of President Nicanor Duarte Frutos, the 2008 election of the country’s first 
non-Colorado Party (ANR) president (Fernando Lugo) of the modern-era, Lugo’s impeachment 
and replacement by the country’s first modern-era Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) 
president (Lugo’s vice-president, Federico Franco) in 2012, and the return of a Colorado to the 
presidency with the election of President Horacio Cartes in 2013.  The next Paraguayan 
presidential and legislative elections will take place in 2018. 
When the chapter was written, the authors astutely noted that the Paraguayan 
policymaking process was still in a state of flux after a mere dozen years since the return to 
democracy.  What was once flux has, over time, become a more steady state, with a political 
system for which the democratic transition is today two-dozen years in the rearview mirror. 
 
8.1  The Executive Branch 
 
Overall, the chapter’s description and analysis of the Paraguayan executive branch still rings true 
today.  While the abbreviated presidency of Fernando Lugo represented a partial departure from 
the political status quo regarding executive power, policymaking, and influence, the Paraguayan 
political system returned to the broader political status quo with the election of Horacio Cartes in 
2013.  Lugo’s presidency did, however, reinforce a crucial point made in the chapter, that the 
institutional powers of the Paraguayan president are relatively modest, with the president’s 
ability to implement his policy agenda and exercise power generally more dependent on his 
status as the leader of his party and the ability to marshal its support behind him in the 
Paraguayan Congress than on the formal powers provided to the president in the Paraguayan 
Constitution. 
The chapter’s overview of the executive branch under the 1992 Constitution depended on 
approximately ten years of evidence, with a large portion coming from the “accidental 
presidency” of Luis González Macchi (1999-2003) who arrived to the presidency after the 
democratically elected Raúl Cubas Grau (1998-1999) was impeached after his vice president 
(and intra-party Colorado rival) Luis María Argaña was assassinated in 1999.  As a result, the 
addition of the data points from the Duarte Frutos (2003-2008), Lugo (2008-2012), Franco 
(2012-2013), and Cartes (2013- ) administrations would more than double the amount of data 
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available for analysis as well as provide variance due to the presence of non-Colorado presidents 
during this period, Lugo in particular, but also Franco.  The original chapter was written during 
the first half of the Duarte Frutos administration but most of the data analysis came from the 
prior presidencies.  While the Spanish version of the chapter did extend briefly into the Lugo 
presidency, the main conclusions regarding the executive branch were drawn principally from 
the first two presidential periods of the current democratic era. 
 
8.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
The description of the legislative branch as a factionalized institution where pork and patronage 
are utilized to gain support for legislation and to build coalitions still holds true today.  The 
electoral rules adopted at the time of the transition to democracy in the early 1990s remain in 
force in 2016.  One important feature of the Paraguayan electoral system, which was still in its 
infancy at the time the chapter was written, is the use by the major parties of democratic 
primaries to choose their presidential and legislative candidates, primaries in which proportional 
representation is employed to allocate the positions on the legislative lists among the competing 
intra-party lists/factions. It appears likely that these party primary rules simultaneously foment 
the factionalism noted in legislative behavior and coalition formation but also help to explain the 
continued robustness of the ANR and PLRA as political parties (e.g., decreasing the incentives 
for leaders to defect or form rival parties). 
Legislative fragmentation rose in the 2000s as the result of the Oviedo/anti-Oviedo 
schism within the Colorado Party and the rise (brief as it turns out) of Lugo’s broad center-left 
alliance that sought to break the stranglehold of the country’s historic two-party duopoly (ANR-
PLRA).  However, with the de facto reunification of the ANR (aided by Lino Oviedo’s death in 
an accidental helicopter crash in 2013 and the de facto disintegration of his party, UNACE) and 
the decline of the center-left following Lugo’s troubled presidency and impeachment, the ANR-
PLRA dominance of the Paraguayan Congress has been restored (with the caveat of course that 
both parties have significant internal factions).  For example, as of October of 2016 the two 
parties combined for 74 of the 80 national deputies (with the remainder spread across four 
largely center-left delegations) and 34 (counting UNACE as a PC splinter) of the 45 seats in the 
Paraguayan Senate (elected via a nation-wide district using proportional representation with no 
threshold).  The remaining 11 senate seats are spread across five small center and center-left 
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parties.  In the Paraguayan Chamber of Deputies, the effective number of legislative parties rose 
from an average of a little more than 2 in the 1990s to more than 3 in the 2000s before falling 
back to around 2 and a half in the 2013 election (2.4 to be precise). 
 
8.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
The coverage of the judicial branch was relatively limited in the chapter.  The chapter focused 
primarily on the changes in the 1992 Constitution that created the conditions for a more 
independent judicial branch, albeit one that was not all that competent. 
 
8.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
Paraguay is a unitary state with subnational authorities (governors and department assemblies at 
the department level and mayors and municipal councils at the municipality level) first elected 
only in 1993.  The chapter did not focus much at all on the role of department and municipal 
elected officials in the policymaking process, in part because of the unitary reality in Paraguay 
and in part due to the relatively young nature of these subnational governments at the time the 
original chapter was written. 
At present, Paraguayan governors and mayors do not occupy a central role in the 
policymaking process.  However, anecdotally the 17 department executive branches and 
departmental assemblies do represent an increasingly important farm system for the Paraguayan 
political parties, with many current national deputies and senators and executive branch officials 
using these posts as stepping stones in their political careers (i.e., progressive ambition).  They 
also serve as valuable sources of patronage for the major political parties, both in terms of 
elected offices as well as appointed posts in the departmental executive and legislative branches.  
A similar pattern is seen to exist at the municipal level, especially in regard to the country’s 
largest cities (Asunción in particular, but also medium-sized cities such as Ciudad del Este, San 
Lorenzo, and Capiatá).  The two-party dominance of the Paraguayan party system today is 
visible in the department governments, with 16 of 17 governors and 197 of 226 department 
assembly members (205 if one includes UNACE as part of the ANR) belonging to either the 
ANR or PLRA.  And, a small regional party in the sparsely populated department of Presidente 
Hayes accounts for the 17th governor and seven of the remaining assembly members, with the 
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country’s principal center-left parties possessing a mere 11 department assembly seats across the 
entire country. 
 
8.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
Among the Latin American political party systems, the Paraguayan party system is among the 
most stable.  The two dominant parties in the country’s transition election (in 1993), the ANR 
and PLRA, are still the two dominant parties today.  Both parties have deep historic roots in the 
country.  There also has intermittently been some space for smaller center-left parties in the 
country, which have varied in name, number, and relevance during the country’s two-dozen year 
democratic history.  In addition, the basic rules governing the election of the president, senators, 
deputies, governors, and other elected officials have remained essentially unchanged since the 
chapter was written and still have a comparable impact on party and elite behavior.   
Overall the description of the ANR and PLRA contained in the chapter still matches well 
with the reality of the parties today.  Both the ANR and PLRA retain a strong national presence 
as well as continue to possess a significant level of internal factionalism, with this factionalism 
being especially strong and semi-institutionalized within the ANR.  In contrast, the center-left 
parties tend to lack a broad national presence and partisan infrastructure compared to the ANR 
and PLRA.  As the Spanish language chapter in particular was written during a period of relative 
success for the center-left parties, it does not reflect as well the current weakened state of those 
parties within the Paraguayan political party system. 
 
8.6  Bureaucracies 
 
The chapter underscores the adverse impact that Paraguay’s lack of a professionalized 
bureaucracy has had on the policymaking process.  Despite efforts at modest reforms, little in the 
way of civil service standards exist and partisan and factional ties are paramount for obtaining 
positions (at all levels) in the country’s large patronage-ridden bureaucracy. 
The bureaucracy described in the chapter corresponds well to that which exists today.  
Nevertheless, upon taking office, President Cartes successfully moved to increase transparency 
regarding who was on the public payroll and how much they were being paid.  Amidst the 
pressures occasioned by the country’s factional politics and the reality of Cartes need of 
legislative and political support to govern, it is however unclear how deep these reforms have 
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been and the extent to which they have altered the primordial patronage nature of the country’s 
bureaucracy.   
 
8.7  Other Institutions 
 
Paraguay continues to be a relatively low-quality democracy where a concentrated economic and 
political elite has demonstrated its power (e.g., the impeachment of President Lugo) to block 
most reforms that might have changed the economic, social, or political status quo.  If we reflect 
on the broader societal, cultural, and economic conditions in Paraguay today compared to the 
mid-2000s when this chapter was written, they remain relatively unchanged. 
 
8.8  Conclusion 
 
This chapter represented a landmark study of Paraguayan political institutions and policymaking 
and has for the past eight years served as the go-to reference for scholars and policymakers who 
need to get up to speed on Paraguayan politics and policymaking. The chapter was written during 
the early days of Paraguayan democracy when many of these institutions and processes were still 
in a state of flux and while some of these institutions and processes are virtual carbon copies of 
those detailed by the authors, others have changed in important respects during the intervening 
ten years. 
 
9.  Venezuela 
 
This section provides a review of the chapter on Venezuela: “Political Institutions, and 
Policymaking in Veneuzela: The Rise and Collapse of Political Cooperation”/”Instituciones 
Políticas y Formulación de Políticas Públicas en Venezuela: Auge y Colapso de la Cooperación 
Política” by Francisco Monaldi, Rosa Amelia González, Richard Obuchi, and Michael Penfold.  
The chapter is based primarily from on insights and analysis of Venezuelan politics obtained 
through an examination of the period of democratic consolidation, cooperation, and stability 
(1958 to 1988) and of the period of democratic deconsolidation, conflict, and instability (1989-
2006/09).  It effectively ends its coverage during the consolidation of the Chavista competitive 
authoritarian model of governance. 
Far more so than in the other seven countries examined in this volume, Venezuelan 
political history is now just that, history.  The Venezuelan political system has been transformed 
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to such an extent, first under Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) and then under his successor Nicolás 
Maduro (2013- ), that there are comparatively few lessons from Venezuela’s past political 
history as a stable and consolidated democracy that can help us understand the political 
institutions and actors today who are most relevant for the policymaking process in Venezuela. 
In addition, the intellectual approach articulated in the broader volume is predicated on a 
country meeting a minimum set of democratic criteria.  This does not signify that a country has 
to reach optimal levels of free and fair elections, political rights, and civil liberties á la Chile, but 
it does have to surpass at least minimalist requirements.  And, today, it is clear that Venezuela 
cannot be considered to meet even the minimal criteria necessary to be classified as a democracy. 
 
9.1  The Executive Branch 
 
As signaled in the original chapter, the Constitution of 1999 significantly increased the power of 
the executive branch vis-à-vis other actors. This concentration has been amplified over the 
subsequent 17 years via institutional and non-institutional routes, arriving at the present situation 
where the actual constitutional checks on the Venezuelan executive branch are meager. 
 
9.2  The Legislative Branch 
 
In 2015 the Venezuelan opposition captured a near two-thirds majority of the seats in semi-
competitive elections where the opposition was successful in spite of an electoral system rigged 
against it, ranging from the gerrymandered apportionment of legislative seats, a biased referee 
(the National Electoral Council, or CNE), and the government’s ability to tap all of the resources 
of the Venezuelan state to support its campaign.  The opposition victory nevertheless turned out 
to be a rather hollow one. 
The opposition now has control of the legislative branch and the true image of 
Venezuelan democracy (which had been somewhat obscured by the veneer of Chavista control 
of the Venezuelan National Assembly) has been made clear.  Even within the constitutional 
context where the legislative branch is on a weaker footing with the executive branch, the 
moderate political power possessed on paper by the Venezuelan National Assembly has been 
nearly completely emasculated by the refusal of Chavismo to respect the Venezuelan 
Constitution; which itself is a creation of Chavismo. The result is a legislative branch that 
primarily serves as a soapbox for the opposition (a non-trivial matter in a country where the 
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government indirectly or directly controls or exercises influence over almost all other major 
public and private institutions), rather than an actor that is able to fully utilize the powers 
ascribed to it under the Venezuelan Constitution. 
 
9.3  The Judicial Branch 
 
The chapter’s discussion of the judicial branch was relatively modest.  It suffices to say that at 
present the Venezuelan judicial branch serves as an appendage of the executive branch and of 
Chavismo in general.  As the chapter clearly notes, in Venezuela the concept of judicial 
independence is today quite foreign. 
 
9.4  Federalism and Subnational Authorities 
 
The original chapter highlighted the curvilinear nature of federalism in Venezuela.  While 
formally federal for more than a century, federalism in practice did not begin to take off in the 
country until 1989 when the first direct elections of state governors and municipal mayors were 
held.  The 1990s represented a golden era for federalism in Venezuela, but as foreshadowed in 
the chapter, and even more strongly felt today, the country’s federal institutions have been 
severely weakened by formal (the clawing back of power and the creation of parallel institutions) 
and informal maneuvering by the federal government that has relegated governors and mayors 
(even more so) to the status of relative figureheads, with almost all policy decisions today 
effectively made by national government appointed actors, especially when the state or 
municipality is governed by a chief executive (i.e., governor or mayor) belonging to the 
opposition. 
Federalism is likely to be a crucial topic of any future constitutional reform process given 
the ability of robust federalism to limit the degree to which the presidential election becomes a 
winner-take-all game by providing the losing side with the ability to govern with some autonomy 
at the state (in particular) and municipal levels.  In a country as polarized as Venezuela, 
federalism could play an important role in promoting consensual government in the future. 
 
9.5  Political Parties and Party Systems 
 
The Venezuelan political party system, which served as the linchpin of the Venezuelan 
democratic system in the first period of democratic consolidation, cooperation and stability, is 
dead.  This two party duopoly, formed by Democratic Action (AD) and COPEI, no longer exists, 
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with AD now a second tier actor within the broader Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) 
opposition coalition and COPEI a third-tier player.  Other parties, in particular Justice First (PJ), 
and their principal leaders have supplanted AD and COPEI as the leading voice of the opposition.  
At the same time, the Chavista Movement’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) now 
occupies a political space that was unoccupied by a significant political party during the period 
of democratic consolidation (1958-88). 
The Venezuelan political party system has changed dramatically since the end of the first 
democratic period in the late 1980s, but is even substantially transformed compared to ten years 
ago.  Most importantly, the country’s largest single political movement, Chavismo, was created 
as personalist vehicle of a man who passed away in 2013.  Key to understanding Venezuela’s 
current and future policymaking process is how Chavismo will continue to function as a 
movement without Chávez, and, especially, if it finds itself no longer in control of the national 
executive branch and all of the resources for patronage and enrichment that control provides in 
what according to Transparency International is one of Latin America’s most corrupt countries.  
In addition, at present there exist significant fissures within Chavismo (e.g., pro-Maduro vs. anti-
Maduro; ultra-Chavistas vs. pragmatists; military vs. civilian origin), with these divisions 
potentially of profound relevance for current and future governance and public policy in 
Venezuela. 
Of equal importance is developing a better understanding of the opposition MUD 
coalition.  This involves understanding more about the newer parties that play a prominent role 
in the coalition such as the PJ, but also the mechanisms by which the MUD coalition functions in 
terms of decision making and political coordination.  Moreover, to date the glue which has held 
the MUD together is its opposition to Chavismo. It is therefore unclear how the MUD would 
function as a governing coalition were it to take control of the executive branch. 
 
9.6  Bureaucracies 
 
In the years since the chapter was written the country’s already hyper-partisan, ineffective, and 
corrupt bureaucracy has become even more partisan, ineffective, and corrupt.  A major issue that 
will confront any future president, especially a non-Chavista one, is how to deal with a 
bureaucracy that has become far more a vehicle for patronage than public service.  Also meriting 
further discussion is the rapid growth over the past ten years of state-run companies that are 
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economically unviable, yet have for all intents and purposes become part of the bureaucracy, 
with their employees now public sector workers.  And, there is additionally the issue of the rising 
partisanship and increasing degree of executive branch dependence that has undermined the 
legitimacy of the electoral process in Venezuela as the CNE has become even more subservient 
to the executive branch since the original chapter was written. 
Even in the best (from an economic diversification perspective) of times around four-
fifths of Venezuela’s export earnings came from the hydrocarbons industry, and today that share 
is closer to 95 percent.  One of the ignominious distinctions of the Chávez administration was its 
transformation of a relatively efficient, independent, and professional national oil company 
(PDVSA) into an inefficient, dependent, and unprofessional institution which is incapable today 
of allowing Venezuela to fully exploit its petroleum reserves, reserves which are key to the 
country’s development and prosperity.   
 
9.7  Other Institutions 
 
In no other country included in the volume have we witnessed a decline in democratic conditions 
similar to that seen in Venezuela over the past twenty years.  As late as 1998 Venezuela received 
a 2.5 “free” rating from Freedom House, but since that time the country’s democratic system has 
experienced significant erosion, with its most recent score a “partly free” rating of 5.0, placing 
the country on the brink of falling into the dubious category of “not free.”  In light of recent 
events it is a near certainty that the country is already in “not free” territory, but given the annual 
nature of Freedom House’s ratings, we will have to wait until early 2017 to know for sure. 
As mentioned previously, the role of political institutions and actors in the policymaking 
process is quite different in a democracy than in a dictatorship, and the general model utilized in 
the larger volume in which this chapter is situated takes as a given a minimum level of 
democracy, something that is absent in Venezuela.  Furthermore, unlike in the other seven 
countries, where the armed forces are for all intents and purposes entirely subordinated to the 
democratically elected constitutional government and their commander and chief, in Venezuela 
the military and specific military actors have begun to play an increasingly influential and 
independent role in the political process, underscoring the need for a better understanding of the 
incentives and goals of the military in Venezuela today. 
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9.8  Conclusion 
 
The original chapter described a Venezuela that in many important respects increasingly no 
longer exists.  As foreshadowed by the chapter, the country has transitioned from being one of 
shining examples of democracy (albeit not without flaws, especially in the area of social policy) 
in Latin America to a shining example of a competitive authoritarian regime on the cusp of 
slipping into pure, unadulterated authoritarian rule. This democratic deterioration in turn has 
weakened the general applicability of the approach utilized in the other chapters to Venezuela.   
An optimist would view the present conditions in Venezuela as the nadir of democracy in 
the country with hope for a modern day-Punto Fijo agreement between the opposition and 
pragmatic Chavistas before the end of the decade. A pessimist would view the present conditions 
in Venezuela as part of a continued slide deeper and deeper into authoritarianism, a form of 
government where political institutions and the policymaking process function in a manner quite 
distinct from that found in democracies.  At the present time, there are some reasons to be 
cautiously optimistic about Venezuela’s democratic future, but not so many that the fears of the 




The eight preceding country specific reviews underscore how the current relevance and 
applicability of the original diagnostics and analysis in these volumes to understanding political 
institutions and policy outcomes vary considerably in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela.  Given the fundamental importance of these volumes 
to the global community, however, a very good case can be made for the need for a revised 
version of the chapter in the case of all eight countries, revisions which could form the 
foundation of an updated version of the path breaking Policymaking in Latin America to be 
published on the ten-year anniversary of the original volume in 2018. 
The need for a revision to the original chapter is the greatest for Ecuador and especially 
for Venezuela, where the political system and policymaking process ten years ago is quite 
distinct from that today.  In other cases, the general analysis and description from circa 2006 still 
does a solid job by and large of describing the key actors and functioning of the policymaking 
process today, but at the same time there exist several changes that are of sufficient substance 
and import that the original conclusions reached in the chapter may very well need to be 
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modified, and, even when no modification turns out to be necessary, a revision would allow us to 
continue to have confidence in the veracity of the chapter’s conclusions instead of doubt. 
Countries in this category are Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Paraguay.  Finally, the 
Chilean chapter is the contribution that at present would appear to be least in need of a revision, 
given that the institutions and policymaking process detailed by its authors closely resemble 
those today. However, in light of a landmark 2015 electoral reform that could potentially weaken 
one of the four pillars (two stable electoral/governing coalitions) of the successful Chilean model, 
a revised chapter that analyzes this change and its initial impact is very much needed. 
Overall, it is difficult to overstate the importance and impact of Policymaking in Latin 
America: How Politics Shapes Policies (2008) and El Juego Político en América Latina:  ¿Como 
se Deciden las Políticas Públicas? (2010). From the time of their publication to the present they 
have served as invaluable resources for a large and diverse group of users.  However, to maintain 
their impact and value for these users, they should be revised and updated to both take advantage 
of additional data which have become available with the passage of time as well as to modify 
their analysis and conclusions in light of institutional, partisan, and other changes which have 
taken place in the eight countries over the past ten years. 
In addition to the revised version of the original volume covering Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela, it would also be potentially beneficial to 
explore the possibility of extending the analysis to a set of countries beyond these eight via either 
the commissioning of new volumes or the addition of new country volumes as part of the core 
revision. One group of countries could include the nine presidential democracies not among the 
original eight studied, six located in Central America/the Caribbean (Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama) and three located in South America 
(Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay). A second group of countries could include the region’s more 
populous parliamentary democracies which with some partial exceptions (notably Suriname, but 
also in some respects Guyana) feature political institutions that are heavily based on a 
Westminster model of government: Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, 
and Trinidad and Tobago.  
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